Ensuring privacy of sensitive data is essential in many contexts, such as healthcare data, banks, ecommerce, wireless sensor networks, and social networks. It is common that different entities coordinate or want to rely on a third party to solve a specific problem. At the same time, no entity wants to publish its problem data during the solution procedure unless there is a privacy guarantee. Unlike cryptography and differential privacy based approaches, the methods based on optimization lack a quantification of the privacy they can provide. The main contribution of this paper is to provide a mechanism to quantify the privacy of a broad class of optimization approaches. In particular, we formally define a one-tomany relation, which relates a given adversarial observed message to an uncertainty set of the problem data. This relation quantifies the potential ambiguity on problem data due to the employed optimization approaches. The privacy definitions are then formalized based on the uncertainty sets. The properties of the proposed privacy measure is analyzed. The key ideas are illustrated with examples, including localization, average consensus, among others.
of the solution of problem (1) and the desired privacy level of the problem data, quantified by ǫ. In addition, the applicability of differential privacy based approaches for solving problem (1) can usually be limited. Note that specifying the noise properties, such as variances to achieve a pre-specified differential privacy is solely dependent on the sensitivity of the related functions (e.g., objective, constraint, subgradient functions) with respect to perturbations of the problem data. In general, quantifying such sensitivities in a closed-form is challenging. One can certainly compute some bounds. However, unless the bounds are tight, the noise variance computed based on the bounds will be over estimated, which in turn can degrade the optimality of the solution significantly [6] , [7] , [12] .
As opposed to the cryptography and differential privacy based methods discussed above, there is another class of approaches, which answers Q2 [5] , [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] , yet answers to Q1 are rather intuitively explained. The key idea of the methods is to use algebraic manipulations to disguise the original problem into an equivalent problem so that the problem data {c i } i=1:N is somehow hidden. We refer to these approaches as algebraic transformation methods. Algebraic transformation methods are promising in the sense that they are efficient and usually guarantee the optimality of the solution of problem (1) , though privacy of the methods is not quantified. The approaches are typically applied to a broader class of problems, as opposed to the cryptographic or differential privacy based approaches. Therefore it is still desirable to quantify their privacy as response to Q1.
C. Our Contributions
The main contribution of this paper is to quantify the privacy properties of a broader class of optimization approaches, where the algebraic transformation methods are particular cases.
More specifically, the proposed privacy definition applies to 1) methods via standard objective/constraint transformations, 2) methods via standard variable transformations, 3) classical decomposition methods, e.g., primal and dual decomposition, and 4) state-of-the-art alternating direction method of multipliers method (ADMM).
To do this, the underlying disguise of problem data {c i } i=1:N due to those optimization approaches is formally represented as a one-to-many binary relation between the observed message of an adversary and an uncertainty set, in which the sensitive problem data {c i } i=1:N itself is a member. The privacy of the associated method can then be quantified by the properties June 16, 2014 DRAFT of the uncertainty set. The properties of the proposed privacy measure is analyzed. Given an optimization approach as response to Q2, our definition answers Q1. Implications of the proposed privacy measure is discussed. Our privacy definition allows comparing the privacy of different optimization approaches applied to a problem. It quantifies the best and the worst privacy for an specified problem data. Several examples are given to illustrate the key ideas.
In § II we present our new proposed definitions and other basic ones, useful for describing the privacy properties of optimization approaches. Application of the proposed privacy definitions for optimization approaches are illustrated in § III. Conclusions are given in § IV.
Notations: Boldface lower case and upper case letters represent vectors and matrices, respectively, and calligraphy letters represent sets. The Euclidean-n space and the positive integers are denoted by IR n and IN, respectively. The superscript (·) T is the transpose. We use the notation
The identity matrix, all zero vector, and all one vector, are denoted by I, 0, and 1, respectively. The ℓ 2 -norm of x is denote by ||x|| 2 . The power set of an arbitrary
space Ω is denoted by P(Ω). A ball with radius r and center b is denoted by B(r, b). Finally, we denote by , the component-wise inequality.
II. PRIVACY QUANTIFICATIONS
Original definitions together with other basic definitions and assumptions for quantifying the privacy properties of the optimization approaches are given. The essential implications of the definitions are also discussed.
A. Problem Data and the Adversary
Definition 1 (Inputs, input tuples, and messages): Consider the problem (1). We call the set of problem data {c i } i=1:N , denoted C, the inputs of problem (1) .
where f is a possibly vector valued function with non-constant components. Moreover, suppose that c lies in a metric space X c . We call c, an input tuple of C. Finally, we call a finite summarizes a property of K that will be useful later.
Remark 1: For a given problem and its solution approach, the knowledge K of a third party can be further improved and can never be decreased as time elapses. In other words, given time
where K t i denotes the adversarial knowledge at time t i . As a result, unless the underlying solution method is changed, it is always the case that
Note that different solution methods in general can yield different sets of knowledge, even if the problem is fixed. Finally, recall that the set C of the inputs/outputs is deterministic, cf. Assumption 1. Therefore, the adversarial knowledge K does not contain elements such as probability density functions or cumulative distribution functions to describe statistical models for c i ∈ C.
Definition 4 (Obfuscation of the input and uncertainty sets):
Let C, c, S, and K denote the input, an input tuple, a message of problem (1), and the adversarial knowledge, respectively, cf. Definition 1. Suppose S ⊆ K. We say c ∈ X c is obfuscated if there exists a one-to-many
Obfuscation of an input tuple c, where binary relation R c from the singleton {S} to a nonempty set U c ⊆ X c , such that (S, c) ∈ R c .
We call the (possibly unbounded) set U c = {u | (S, u) ∈ R c }, the uncertainty set for c. ◭
The one-to-many nature of such relations is the mechanism of achieving ambiguity in c,
cf. Figure 1 . An example to clarify Definition 4 is given below:
Example 1: Consider a client-cloud environment, where the client has an optimization problem with problem input C = {a, b}, where a, b ∈ IR n are private data that the client cares about. The cloud (potential adversary)
solves the problem for the client. Suppose that the employed deterministic solution methods for the problem is such that client has to outsource the two scalars s 1 and s 2 to the cloud, where s 1 = ||a|| 2 2 and s 2 = b T a, that is the message S = (s 1 , s 2 ). Suppose, in addition, cloud knows n (i.e., auxiliary knowledge) and wants to find input tuple a. Then we have
Trivially, having more knowledge of an input tuple c can only reduce the ambiguity in c. This phenomenon is formally expressed in the following remark, cf. Figure 1 .
Remark 2:
Let R c (K 1 ) and R c (K 2 ) be relations defined as in Definition 4 associated with a problem, where the inevitable knowledge is identical in both cases, i.e., K 1 ⊇ S and K 2 ⊇ S for some message S. Then
We note that, in many interesting cases, the considered optimization approaches in this paper can be used to realize a relation R c as defined in Definition 4. We capitalize on the properties of such relations resulted by optimization approaches, when quantifying the privacy.
B. Privacy Index
Given a relation R and its associated uncertainty set U that lies in a metric space X (cf. Definition 4). We consider the following metrics to quantify the size and the spread of U.
1) Diameter of U, denoted d(U).
2) Counting measure of U, denoted by µ(U) [21, p. 146 ].
June 16, 2014 DRAFT
The diameter gives a measure of the worst discrepancy between any two points in the uncertainty set. In particular, we define d(·) as follows:
Definition 5 (Diameter/center of an uncertainty set): Given an input tuple c of the input C and c lies in a metric space X c . Let U c ⊆ X c denote the uncertainty set of c. Then the diameter
where || · || is some norm on X c . The argument v that achieves d(U c ) is called the center of U c and is denoted by c(U c ). If the set U c is unbounded, we say any point in X c achieves d(U c ), From (2) , it follows that c ⋆ adv = c(U c ) and the adversary's worst discrepancy between its guess c ⋆ adv and c is given by (1/2)d(U c ). On the other hand, if the set U c is unbounded, a rational adversary has no preference for one point in X c over another. Therefore, the adversary's worst discrepancy is unbounded above, irrespective of its guess c ⋆ adv . The counting measure of an uncertainty set is an estimate of the number elements in it [21, p. 146], and is defined below.
Definition 6 (Counting measure of an uncertainty set):
Given an input tuple c of the input C that lies in a metric space X c . Let U c ⊆ X c denote the uncertainty set of c. The counting measure of U c is µ(U c ), where µ:P(X c )→IN∪∞ is
with | · | denoting the cardinality of a finite set. ◭
The metric µ(U c ) for quantifying the uncertainty set U c can be motivated as follows. If U c June 16, 2014 DRAFT 8 is finite, the value µ(U c ) can be used to quantify the adversary's best worst-case winning 2 probability, denoted p win w-c , and to characterizes the probability mass function (pmf) of adversary's guess, denoted p ⋆ adv , to achieve p win w-c . Recall that c is deterministic, cf. Assumption 1. That is, the adversary has no statistical models for describing the variation in c. Therefore, a natural criterion for any rational adversary is to choose a probability distribution that maximizes the resulting winning probability Pr(adversary wins), among all possible probability distributions for c. From basic probability rules, we get p 
The last metric used to quantify the properties of U c is its affine dimension, i.e., a(U c ).
In particular, a(U c ) is the dimension of its affine hull [22, § 2. 
, for all unitary matrices P ∈ IR n×n and U ⊆ IR n , where PU = {Pu | u ∈ U}.
e) U ⊆ V ⇒ ρ(U) ρ(V).
2 Here the term winning refers to the event of guessing correctly c. As we will see next, Proposition 1 is useful for explaining interesting implications of the privacy index. Especially, the parts a), b) e), and f) of Proposition 1 are more relevant.
C. Implications of the Privacy Index
By definition, the privacy index ρ lies in the extended IR 3 and is nonnegative, cf. are designed specifically to illustrate our point.
A. Transformation of Objective and Constraint Functions
Suppose ψ 0 : ID 0 ⊆ IR → IR is monotonically increasing and ID 0 ⊇ range(f 0 ). Moreover,
Let P denote the problem formed by using Scaling used in [5] , [18] [19] [20] is a particular case of the objective and constrained transformation. In [15] , authors handle their affine constraint functions, denoted Ax−b=0, by using ϕ(z)=Bz, where B is full column rank with the desired properties Ax−b=0⇔B(Ax−b)=0.
Now, we present a new, yet an important example to convey the idea. 
The beacons communicate with each other to computeĀ andȳ, which is transmitted to B, i.e., the message S=(Ā,ȳ). Let us now explore the privacy of this method on the input tuple c=y 1 a 1 , the location of beacon 1.
Without loss of generality, letx=(0, 0). Suppose B knows by definition ||a 1 ||=1,
, and, of course, N =N 0 , i.e., the auxiliary knowledge. Thus,
Note that a i ∈E(Ā) ∀i is a necessary condition, by definition ofĀ. Let us next compute ρ(U c ).
We first build some intuition of U c . The figure above illustrates all possible cases, the circle and the shaded area represent the unit circle O and the ellipse E, respectively. So, a 1 ∈ O ∩ E. Note that y i is simply the magnitude of some vector in IR 2 , which is spanned by vectors in O ∩ E. Now consider scenario 1, where The second equality agrees with our intuition in the sense that the ambiguity in c is identical in the associated two settings. The last inequality can be intuitively explained as follows: scenario 1,2-case (c) corresponds to a setting where the beacon measurements are linearly dependent, and therefore the beacon 1 can be any point along the line A 1 A 2 , as opposed to scenario 2-case (b), where the beacon measurements are not linearly dependent.
B. Transformation via Change of Variables
Suppose the decision variable x in problem (1) is in IR n . Let φ : IR m → IR n be a function such that range(φ) ⊇ i dom(g i ). Now consider the problem, denoted Q, achieved by the change of variables x = φ(z). Then Q is equivalent to problem (1) in the sense that if z ⋆ solves Q,
. Note again that any potential obfuscation of problem data (cf. Definition 4) is directly linked to the function compositions, f 0 (φ(·)), g(φ(·)), and h(φ(·)).
All the approaches in [5] , [13] , [14] , [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] can be obtained as a particular case of the change of variables. In particular, those methods uses an affine φ. Let us now give an example for a case where φ is not necessarily affine.
Example 3 (Resource allocation):
Suppose an ammunition supply depot (ASD) wants to transfer N -types of nuclear-ammunition to the war field. Let β i denote the radiation per unit volume of ith ammunition type. The overall radiation should be no greater than a specified value γ. The containers for each type i should be cubic of length x i . The criterion for computing the volume of type i is determine by the penalty function α i /x i , where α i denote the priority levels of the ith type. Suppose the ASD relies on a third party to compute the desired container box lengths
i ≤ γ and x ≥ 0. The problem data is α i > 0, β i > 0, and γ > 0. On the other hand, suppose the ASD does not want to reveal the input tuples (α i , β i ), i = 1, . . . , N .
What if ASD uses the change of variable
Then it is sufficient to ask the third party (say B) to minimize 1, 2 ). This is the highest possible privacy for an input tuple in IR 2 , cf. Proposition 1-(a).
One can readily apply hybrid variants of the transformation via change of variables and transformation of objective and constraints, cf. [18] , [20] .
C. Decomposition Methods
In this section, we highlight important aspects of decomposition methods for preserving privacy of problem data. In particular, the dual decomposition method is considered. Arguments, in the case of primal decomposition methods and ADMM method are similar.
We start by noting that the decomposition methods are applied whenever the problem structure inherently possesses some separability properties, where the original problem can be solved by coordinating smaller subproblems, one for each subsystem. Thus, instead of problem (1), the general problem we consider in this section is given by
where the variables are (x i , y i ) i=1:N and z, and i denotes the subsystem index. Typically, x i , y i and z are called local, interface, and global variables, respectively. The matrix E i is a 0-1 matrix that maps z into the interface variables y i . This mapping accounts for the coupling of the problem and ensures consensus between subsystem interface variables and the global variables. The set
is the constraints at the subsystem i and is dependent on the private problem data c i . Let us now summarize the standard dual decomposition algorithm and see how it preserves privacy for private data c i .
while (stopping criterion)
1. Subsystem i minimizes fi(xi, yi; ci) + λ T i yi subject to (xi, yi) ∈ Gi(ci), with (xi, yi). Let x
i (ci) denote the solution. 2. Subsystems coordinate to update global z, i.e., z := (E T E)
In the algorithm above, α k is an appropriate step size [23] . As far as the privacy of the problem data is concerned, the crucial step of the algorithm is step 2. This is because the coordination requires exchange of messages, which are dependent on the problem data. In particular, the ith subsystem requires revealing message, denoted S 
The step 2 is simply the average z := (1/N ) N i=1 (c i − λ i /2) and step 3 is λ i := λ i + α k y (k)
i (c i ) − z . Thus, the message exposed by subsystem 1 to subsystem N is S 1 = y (k) 1 (c 1 ) k=1:T , where T is the total iterations. Without explicitly describing the relation R c1 (or equivalently the uncertainty set U c1 ), we use an alternative method, where the associated ρ(U c1 ) is computed by construction. Now note that if for i = 1, . . . , N − 1, c i and λ i satisfy (6) for all k = 1, . . . , T , so isĉ i (θ i ) = (c i − θ i , λ i − 2θ i ), where θ = (θ i ) i=1:N −1 is chosen such that 1 T θ = 0. Indeed, θ 1 here parameterizes the uncertainty set U c1 . In particular, U c1 = {c 1 − θ 1 | 1 T θ = 0}, which yields ρ(U c1 ) = (∞, 1, 1). This is the highest possible privacy for an input tuple in IR, cf. Proposition 1-a).
Even though, we assume that subsystem N is a passive adversary (cf. Definition 2), it is easily seen that, even if r number of subsystems collude, ρ(U c1 ) = (∞, 1, 1) remains intact, given r < N − 1. In other words, as long as subsystem 1 has at least one reliable subsystem j, j = 1, ρ(U c1 ) = (∞, 1, 1).
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a mechanism to quantify the privacy of a broader class of optimization approaches was proposed. We defined a one-to-many relation, which relates a given adversarial observed message to an uncertainty set of the problem data. The privacy measure was then designed based on the uncertainty sets. The properties of the proposed privacy measure was analyzed.
From the definition it is clear that optimization based approaches lacks robustness to adversarial attacks, such as those involving side information. Our privacy definition clearly model those intrinsic properties of optimization approaches. The key ideas were illustrated by examples.
An important possible extensions is to explore ways of designing optimization approaches to guarantee a specified privacy level.
